Wednesday, February 29, 2012

375: Visual Imagery

Visual Imagery

MENTAL MODELS

We construct mental models of situations.  When we read a sentence, for example, we create a mental picture of what we are reading.  Dr. Kirwan used a specific example of a fantasy novel describing a group of people walking in single file then suddenly talking to each other side by side.  These were two contradicting mental models.

Early on it was thought that these types of mental models were remembered in semantic categories.  Usually these semantic mental models were be explained in sentences.  A type of abstract representation of this is shown in an analog vs proposition of "a ball is on a box."  In proposition you have a relation, syntax, a truth value, it is abstract and it is not spatial.  Another possibility is an analog presentation (e.g., a picture of a ball on a box) and this analog presentation has no distinct relation, no syntax, no truth value until it is described, it is concrete and it is represented in a spatial medium as a picture.  We took a got in the class as to how we experience this sentence (a ball is on a box) and we all agreed that we imagine a picture instead of a proposition.  This was controversial in the 70's but it is becoming clear that this type of analog imagery is more correct.

MEMORIES AND MENTAL MODELS

If you have hippocampal damage how do you do at these types of imagining tasks?  It turns out that people with this type of damage cannot do this very well because we draw on memories to create these imagined scenarios.  So damage to the hippocampus means you will have damage to your memory system which makes it difficult to draw on memories in order to create a mental image/model.  This could be part of the reason why our memories are so susceptible to change based on new information.  We are usually pretty good at keeping imagination and memory separate but it can create some confusion.

PROPERTIES OF MENTAL MODELS

Property 1: Rotation
This is a type of spatial rotation.  There are also sex effects for this where men are slightly quicker and more effective with this than women.  It turns out that the further degree of rotation the two objects are different from each other the longer it takes to do this mental rotation.  This seems to indicate that people are actually visually imagining this mental rotation.  If people were doing this propositionally then it wouldn't take extra time.

Property 2: Size Zooming
A task that exemplifies this property is asking people to imagine a tiger in a small pink square and then tell me what color the tigers nose is.  The smaller the box is the longer it takes to answer this question.  This indicates that we are doing a sort of zooming in to determine what the color of the nose is.  Again this is in opposition to proposition.

Property 3: Scanning
Your task is to view an island with some fictitious landmarks such as a well, a tree, etc.  Then you take the map away and are asked to imagine going from one landmark to another.  If those landmarks are close together your response is faster than if you are asked to go from landmarks that are somewhat further away.  This indicates that people are scanning across the map and is again in opposition to proposition.

Property 4: Brain Locus
If these mental models are represented by language then as you do these tasks your language centers should be activated or if it is visual your visual centers should be activated.  It turns out that the dorsal stream, a visual center, is activated when a person is asked to do these tasks.  Language centers remain inactive.  

THE PIAZZA EXPERIMENT

Imagine that you are in the city square sitting on the cathedral steps looking south, tell me what you see.  Now imagine you are on the other side, now what do you see.  Undamaged people can do this task with little difficulty.  With unilaterally left neglect patients they could only focus their attention on half of the visual scene even for internally generated scenes.  The point is that mental images require you to focus attention on them and that mental images are intact in neglect but there is an attentional problem.

Monday, February 27, 2012

304: Theories of Intelligence and the Binet Scale


 WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

“general potential, independent of previous learning” ~ Saccuzzo

INTELLIGENCE

In class there was a general consensus that intelligence has a lot to do with cognitive functioning.  But where intelligence begins or ends is much more difficult to decide.  For example, at what point can we say that a person’s response is an intelligent response?  Is it just when the answer is correct or is there more to it?  Another example would be from a gymnast (Jennifer in class) who is flying through the air in a flip that almost any other person could not do.  Is this an example of intelligence?  How much of a physical flip is cognitive and how much is physiological?

Saccuzzo, the author of the text we are studying, said that intelligence is a person’s  “general potential, independent of previous learning.”  If intelligence is independent of previous learning, then why is there an information section on current intelligence test that look at your acquired knowledge?  Alfred Binet has given an alternate definition of intelligence when he said it is “the tendency to take and maintain a definitive direction; the capacity to make adaptations for the purpose of attaining a desired end, and the power of autocriticism.”  This definition is one that is much more recognized in the psychological community.

TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE

There are three main ways to define intelligence; the psychometric approach, the information-processing approach, and the cognitive approach.  The first is the psychometric approach.  This is the oldest approach and the focus of chapter 8. 

The second is the information-processing approach.  This approach is the newest approach that is used most often today.  They believe that the scores a person receives are interesting but even more interesting is the way that the participant approaches the test. 

The last is the cognitive approach.  This focusing on how people adapt to real world demands.

GENERAL ABILITIES INDEX (GAI) – on the test!!!

The general abilities index (GAI) is what you calculate when the four scores on the full scale intelligence quotient (FSIQ) are not lining up.  The FSIQ is scored on working memory, processing speed, verbal intelligence quotient (VIQ), and the (PIQ).  You use the GAI usually because working memory and processing scores are not reliable so the GAI ignores those two scores.  This seems to provide good evidence that one need not concern themselves with a FSIQ and just concern themselves with individual scores and what those specifically mean.  However, this would eliminate the concept of spearman’s g.

THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONING

Alfred Binet defined intelligence as the capacity to 1. Find and maintain a definite direction or purpose 2. Make necessary adaptation to achieve that purpose and 3. Engage in self-criticism so necessary adjustments in strategy can be made.  He believed that intelligence expressed itself through judgmentattention, and reasoning.  It is guided by 2 principles underlying all modern intelligence theories; age differentiation and general mental ability.

Age differentiation’s goal was to find tasks in which the age group completion would be 66.67 to 75% (2/3 to ¾)  General mental ability is the total product of the various separate and distinct elements of intelligence.  Binet essentially wanted talks with a strong correlation with each other.

The next big contribution to intelligence testing after Binet came from Spearman.  As we all know Charles Darwin theorized about natural selection.  His brother, Sir Francis Galton, took this idea and wanted to come up with a way to decide which humans are better than others.  Spearman is a student of Galton.  Spearman came up with the positive manifold where he took two tests and if you did well on one test then you could do well on the other.  From this relationship between these two tests he he started to come up with the concept of a general intelligence which he called g.